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FINANCIAL REGULATORY GOVERNANCE IN SOUTH 
AFRICA: THE MOVE TOWARDS TWIN PEAKS 
ANDREW SCHMULOW* 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
The Twin Peaks model of financial system regulation calls for the establishment of 
two, independent, peak regulatory bodies. One charged with ensuring safety and 
soundness in the financial system, the other with preventing market misconduct and 
the abuse of consumers in the financial sector. 
For reasons discussed elsewhere, 1  of the four models of financial system 
regulation,2 Twin Peaks is regarded as best suited to this task. 
The Twin Peaks model in general, and the Australian version of Twin Peaks in 
particular, is currently undergoing implementation in South Africa. This article 
                                                 
* BA Honours LLB (Witwatersrand) PhD (Melbourne). Senior Lecturer in Law and Director 
designate, Business Law, School of Law, The University of Western Australia; Advocate of the High 
Court of South Africa; Principal, Clarity Prudential Regulatory Consulting, Pty Ltd; Visiting 
Researcher, Oliver Schreiner School of Law, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg; Visiting 
Researcher, Centre for International Trade, Sungkyunkwan University, Seoul. This research was 
conducted under the leadership of Professor Andrew Godwin, of the Melbourne Law School, and 
financed in major part thanks to financial support from the Centre for International Finance and 
Regulation (CIFR) in Sydney, Australia. That support, and support in numerous other forms from 
CIFR, is hereby acknowledged with gratitude. Helpful comments and suggestions from Dr Michael 
Taylor, the father of Twin Peaks, Professor Jeffrey Carmichael, Foundation Chair of the Australian 
Prudential Regulation Authority, Professor David Llewellyn, Chair of the Banking Stakeholder Group 
of the European Banking Authority, and Dr Patrick McConnell are acknowledged with great 
appreciation, as is the guidance and friendship of Professor Andrew Godwin. The author may be 
contacted at <Andy.Schmulow@uwa.edu.au>. 
1 A. D. Schmulow, ‘Twin Peaks: A Theoretical Analysis’, in The Centre For International Finance 
and Regulation (CIFR) Research Working Paper Series, no. 064/2015 / Project No. E018, The Centre 
For International Finance and Regulation (CIFR), (1 July, 2015). 
2 See: A.D Schmulow, ‘Approaches to Financial System Regulation: An International Comparative 
Survey’, in The Centre For International Finance and Regulation (CIFR) Research Working Paper 
Series, no. 053/2015 / Project No. E018, The Centre For International Finance and Regulation (CIFR), 
(January, 2015). 
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explores issues related to that implementation from the perspective of governance, as 
it is employed in Australia. The article commences with a discussion and an analysis 
of the historical development of Twin Peaks, followed by a discussion of governance. 
Next is an analysis of key differences between Twin Peaks in Australia and Twin 
Peaks as it is to be employed in South Africa. Finally there are concluding 
observations. 
The article does not canvass the regulatory architecture of Twin Peaks, as this 
has been done elsewhere,3 as have discussions on the need for, and importance of, 
inter-agency co-operation4 in Twin Peaks. 
 
II  HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 
 
The historical development of Twin Peaks provides an insight into its aims, which 
were principally a response to the phenomenon of the ‘blurring of the boundaries’ 
taking place between traditional financial firms in the United Kingdom. The model, 
which was first proposed by Michael Taylor in a pamphlet published by Centre for 
the Study of Financial Innovation in 1994,5 was aimed, primarily, at the Bank of 
England. Australia was, however, the first country to adopt this model – a model 
which is now increasingly being emulated across the globe. 
 
A. The UK 
 
Prior to the advent of Twin Peaks, the UK’s different overseers for conduct and 
systemic issues in the financial sector were so numerous, that it was described as an 
                                                 
3 A. D. Schmulow, supra note 2; A. D. Schmulow, ‘The four methods of financial system regulation: 
An international comparative survey’, 26 (3) Journal of Banking and Finance Law and Practice 
(November, 2015). 
4 A. J. Godwin & A. D. Schmulow, ‘The Financial Sector Regulation Bill In South Africa: Lessons 
From Australia’, 132 (4) South African Law Journal (2015). 
5 A. Hilton, ‘UK financial supervision: a blueprint for change’, in Centre for the Study of Financial 
Innovation Working Paper, no. 6, Centre for the Study of Financial Innovation, (May, 1994). 
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‘alphabet soup’6 of regulators. Taylor argued at the time that those arrangements led 
to conflicts of interest, ‘confusion and damage’.7  
Britain’s system for regulating financial services, as was once said of its Empire, 
has been acquired in a fit of absence of mind.8 
The UK had a Byzantine system of disparate regulators, with each being 
assigned a jurisdiction defined by the type of entity being regulated. 
Contemporaneously, the financial system was increasingly experiencing a ‘blurring of 
the boundaries’ between different kinds of financial institutions. Banks were 
combining with insurers, and investment banks with stockbroking firms. Added to 
this was the presence of large, systemically important building societies.9  
The combination of these factors was identified as necessitating an over-
arching financial services regulator, the purpose of which would be to ensure the 
stability of the financial system.10 
This idea – one, combined financial services regulator - became the first half 
of a more substantial proposal – ‘Twin Peaks’. Taylor11 argued for a fusion of the 
multiple regulators then in existence - regulators charged with banking, securities, 
insurance, and investment management. These regulators included the Bank of 
England, the Building Societies Commission,12 and the Securities and Investments 
Board (SIB).13 
Under Taylor’s plan, a new financial services regulator would henceforth 
assume authority for all deposit-taking institutions14 and, crucially, would no longer 
simply enforce bank regulations against individual transactions. It would be charged 
with ensuring the overall stability of the financial system, by regulating bank capital 
and the control of risk.15  
                                                 
6 M. W. Taylor, ‘“Twin Peaks”: A regulatory structure for the new century’, no. 20, Centre for the 
Study of Financial Innovation, (December, 1995), 7. 
7 Ibid., 1/3. 
8 Ibid., 2. 
9 Ibid., 4. 
10 Ibid., 1. 
11 A. Hilton, supra note 5. 
12 M. W. Taylor, supra note 6, 3. 
13 A. Hilton, supra note 5, 2. 
14 M. W. Taylor, supra note 6, 4. 
15 Ibid., 1. 
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Specifically, Taylor envisaged that the bank regulator would address ‘financial 
soundness of institutions – including capital adequacy and large exposure 
requirements, measures relating to systems, controls and provisioning policies, and 
the vetting of senior managers to ensure that they possessed an appropriate level of 
experience and skill.’ 16  The collapse of Barings Bank 17  in 1995 provided further 
impetus18 for the adoption of a single bank regulator. 
Under Taylor’s proposal a second regulator would then be created, charged 
with protecting consumers from unscrupulous operators: a market conduct and 
consumer protection regulator, 19  the remit of which would be to ensure that 
consumers were treated fairly and honestly, 20  by protecting them against ‘fraud, 
incompetence, or the abuse of market power.’21 Measures would include restrictions 
on the advertising, marketing and sale of financial products, as well as minimum fit 
and proper standards for salespeople. 22  In the event of conflict between the two 
regulators, the Chancellor of the Exchequer would provide a resolution. 
According to Taylor,23 this would address four issues simultaneously: 
i. that henceforth a wide range of financial firms would have to be 
regarded as systemically important; 
ii. that sprawling and disparate regulatory agencies be regarded as 
presenting opportunities for regulatory arbitrage,24 and turf battles over 
jurisdiction;25 
                                                 
16 Ibid., 3. 
17 For more on this see: S. Fay, The Collapse of Barings, W. W. Norton & Co, (1997); A. Tickell, 
‘Making a melodrama out of a crisis: reinterpreting the collapse of Barings Bank’, 14 (1) Environment 
and Planning D: Society and Space (1996); and for a critical theory analysis: A. D. Brown, ‘Making 
sense of the collapse of Barings Bank’, 58 (12) Human Relations (2005). 
18 M. W. Taylor, supra note 6, 2. 
19 Ibid., 1. 
20 Ibid., 1. 
21 Ibid., 3. 
22 Ibid., 3. 
23 Ibid., 4. 
24 And ibid., 7: ‘[the same phenomenon that creates the potential for regulatory arbitrage also creates 
the possibility for] important issues to ‘disappear down the gaps’, and … among consumers [confusion 
is created] by an ‘“alphabet soup” of regulatory bodies’. See also: D. T. Llewellyn, ‘Institutional 
Structure of Financial Regulation and Supervision: The Basic Issues’, Paper presented at the World 
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iii. that in the ever increasing cases of financial conglomerates, a group-
wide perspective on financial soundness would be addressed;26 and 
iv. that rare and specialist expertise and limited supervisory resources 
would be pooled, instead of duplicated by overlapping. 
 
The benefits of Twin Peaks are clear. The proposed structure would eliminate 
regulatory duplication and overlap; it would create regulatory bodies with a 
clear and precise remit; it would establish mechanisms for resolving conflicts 
between the objectives of financial services regulation; and it would encourage a 
regulatory process which is open, transparent and publically accountable.27 
 
These examples show why structure does, and should matter, if we wish to create 
an efficient, effective system of financial services regulation.28 
 
While Llewellyn29 takes a contrary view, arguing that specialist agencies are 
easier to hold to their objectives, in Australia the failures that have occurred under 
each of the two, integrated regulators, have not been due to confusion over 
objectives.30 Rather, they have been due to a weak enforcement culture which has 
                                                                                                                                           
Bank seminar Aligning Supervisory Structures with Country Needs, Washington, DC, (6th and 7th June 
2006), 10, (§ 1). 
25 M. W. Taylor, supra note 6, 11. 
26 Ibid., 5, Taylor discusses the issue of psychological contagion, that is to say a collapse in depositor 
confidence, not because an entity is directly involved in a loss, but because another entity – a 
subsidiary – another part of the same conglomerate, is involved in a loss. This possibility - that retail 
depositor panic can set-off a bank run across all associated entities - underscores the importance of a 
whole-of entity approach to regulation. See also: D. T. Llewellyn, supra note 24, 9. 
27 M. W. Taylor, supra note 6, 1. See also D. T. Llewellyn, supra note 24, 28. 
28 M. W. Taylor, ‘Peak Practice: How to reform the UK’s regulatory system’, no. 23, Centre for the 
Study of Financial Innovation, (October, 1996), 17. 
29 D. T. Llewellyn, supra note 24, 26.  
30  See further, P. McConnell, ‘War on banking’s rotten culture must include regulators’, The 
Conversation, (4 June, 2015 2.14pm AEST), http://theconversation.com/war-on-bankings-rotten-
culture-must-include-regulators-42767; M. Williams, ‘APRA and ASIC need cultural shift’, Asia-
Pacific Banking and Finance, (9 March, 2015), 
https://www.australianbankingfinance.com/banking/apra-and-asic-need-cultural-shift/; A. Schmulow, 
‘To clean up the financial system we need to watch the watchers’, The Conversation, (4 March, 2015 
2.11 pm AEDT), http://theconversation.com/to-clean-up-the-financial-system-we-need-to-watch-the-
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bedevilled especially the market conduct and consumer protection peak, and to which 
this article will return. 
Similarly, Llewellyn argues that integrated agencies are more likely to suffer 
reputational harm, due to the failures of one particular division within the agency and, 
as a result, consumer confidence in the regulator may be weakened.31 This argument 
does comport with the Australian experience, in relation to the manner in which the 
market conduct and consumer protection agency has handled an on-going series of 
financial advice scandals.32 
 
B. Australia33 
 
The ‘Twin Peaks’ model was proposed by, and implemented on, the conclusion of the 
Wallis Commission of Inquiry in 1997.34 In the case of the prudential regulator (PA), 
this replaced eleven separate regulators. 35  To wit, Australia separated the market 
conduct and consumer protection authority – the Australian Securities and Investment 
Commission (ASIC) – from the bank regulator – the Australian Prudential Regulation 
Authority (APRA) – and the National Central Bank (NCB) – the Reserve Bank of 
Australia (RBA).36 Crucially, APRA is not a division of the RBA, whereas in other 
                                                                                                                                           
watchers-38359; A. Ferguson, ‘Hearing into ASIC’s failure to investigate CBA’s Financial Wisdom’, 
The Sydney Morning Herald, (3 June, 2014), http://www.smh.com.au/business/hearing-into-asics-
failure-to-investigate-cbas-financial-wisdom-20140602-39ept.html; P. McConnell, ‘ASIC’s Fashion 
Faux-Pas’, The Conversation, (13 July, 2015 4.25pm AEST), https://theconversation.com/asics-
fashion-faux-pas-44590. 
31 See for example his remarks at: D. T. Llewellyn, supra note 24, 28. 
32 For more on this see: A. D. Schmulow, supra note 1, 43ff. 
33 Elements of this section appeared in substantial part in a previous article, published as a working 
paper by the Centre for International Finance and Regulation: A. D. Schmulow, supra note 2, 40ff. 
34 S. Wallis, B. Beerworth, J. Carmichael, I. Harper & L. Nicholls, Financial System Inquiry, The 
Treasury, (31 March, 1997). See also: J. Black, ‘Managing Regulatory Risks and Defining the 
Parameters of Blame: A Focus on the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority’, 28 (1) Law & 
Policy (January, 2006), 4/5. 
35 J. Black, ibid., 5. 
36 Also created was the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC). If the ACCC is to 
be included, then the Australian model is in fact a ‘quad peak’ model. D. T. Llewellyn, supra note 24, 
17. 
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jurisdictions that have adopted Twin Peaks, the PA has been incorporated as a 
division of the NCB, and this is the arrangement envisaged for South Africa.37  
Under Twin Peaks, the RBA is tasked with, inter alia, overall responsibility 
for the financial system, and as lender of last resort (LLR).38 The Australian model 
could, therefore, reasonably have been described as a three-peak model, with each 
peak created as an independent, statutory body.39 
In respect of governance, in 1999 APRA moved to a risk-based approach to 
supervision.40 In 200241 APRA codified its risk-based approach to financial regulation 
with the introduction of the ‘probability and impact rating system’ (PAIRS),42 and the 
‘supervisory oversight and response system’ (SOARS).43 
PAIRS is a framework for assessing how ‘risky’ an institution is vis-à-vis 
APRA’s objectives; SOARS determines how officials respond to that risk.44 While 
PAIRS examines a number of internal risk indices,45 a glaring omission is its failure to 
provide a formal assessment of industry-wide risks,46 which are particularly germane 
in an industry susceptible to contagion. 
                                                 
37 A. J. Godwin & A. D. Schmulow, supra note 4, 758. 
38 John Trowbridge, ‘The Regulatory Environment - A Brief Tour’, Paper presented at the National 
Insurance Brokers Association (NIBA) Conference, Sydney, NSW, (22 September 2009), Table, 2. 
39 Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act (Cth), No. 51 of 2001, (Australia); Australian 
Prudential Regulation Authority Act (Cth), No. 50 of 1998, (Australia); Reserve Bank Act (Cth), No. 4 
of 1959, (Australia). Independence in this context is a term of art describing the relationship between 
the two peaks. It is not meant to describe the relationship between the peaks and government; in that 
respect their independence is heavily limited. APRA, for example, is subject to limited direction from 
the Minister: s 12, Australian Prudential Regulation Authority Act (Cth), No. 50 of 1998. 
40 J. Black, supra note 34, 5/6. 
41  Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, Probability and Impact Rating System, Australian 
Prudential Regulation Authority, (June, 2012), 
http://www.apra.gov.au/CrossIndustry/Documents/PAIRS-062012-External-version.pdf, 5. 
42 For more, see: Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, ‘Supervision’, in About APRA, published 
by Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, (undated), accessed: 31 July, 2015, 
http://www.apra.gov.au/AboutApra/Pages/Supervision.aspx; J. Black, supra note 34, 10ff. 
43 J. Black, supra note 34, 8ff. 
44 Ibid., 8. 
45 See: ibid., 11. 
46 Ibid. 
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PAIRS differentiates the risk profile of regulated institutions into five 
categories: low, lower medium, upper medium, high, and extreme.47 A similar system 
was used in the UK prior to the global financial crisis (GFC) and the ensuing collapse 
of Royal Bank of Scotland. As a result the efficacy of this ratings matrix is 
questionable. In evaluating the ratings system used to assess the riskiness of Royal 
Bank of Scotland, Hosking states: 
 
The report is a blizzard of acronyms and bogus science: RBS was scored as a 
“medium high minus”[48] risk, whatever that is …49 
 
A key aspect of PAIRS is that it works on a multiplier not a linear scale.50 This 
results in a higher SOARS scale, which in turn, it is argued, compels a more 
aggressive supervisory response.51 
In terms of the potential impact that a regulated entity might have on the 
financial system, these is divided into four categories: low, medium, high and 
extreme.52 This rating is determined relative to the regulated entity’s total Australian 
resident assets, ‘subject to a management override that can raise or lower the impact 
depending on senior management’s assessment’.53 In this regard Black asserts that: 
 
                                                 
47 Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, ‘Probability and Impact Rating System, Chapter 8 - 
Probability of failure’, in About APRA, Probability and Impact Rating System, published by Australian 
Prudential Regulation Authority, (June 2012), accessed: 5 August, 2015, 
http://www.apra.gov.au/AboutAPRA/Pages/PAIRS-1206-HTML.aspx. 
48 For details on this rating, see: Financial Services Authority, ‘The failure of the Royal Bank of 
Scotland’, in Financial Services Authority Board Report, Part 2, Chap. 3, Financial Services Authority, 
(December, 2011), 260, (§ 683). 
49 P. Hosking, ‘More lever-arch files wouldn’t have saved RBS’, The Times, (Morning ed., Tuesday, 13 
December, 2013). 
50 J. Black, supra note 34, 12. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, ‘Probability and Impact Rating System, Chapter 9 - 
Impact of failure’, in About APRA, Probability and Impact Rating System, published by Australian 
Prudential Regulation Authority, (June 2012), accessed: 5 August, 2015, 
http://www.apra.gov.au/AboutAPRA/Pages/PAIRS-1206-HTML.aspx. 
53 J. Black, supra note 34, 13. 
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There was little science involved in determining the dividing lines between the 
ratings, it was more a question of whether the overall result seemed to make 
sense …54 
 
What this flexibility belies, however, is a lack of coherent methodology. 
Rather, reliance is made on intuition and supposition. There is, however, a wealth of 
evidence from psychology that ‘gut instincts’ are frequently unreliable.55 Evidence of 
the failure of this approach is to be found in the rogue trading scandal at National 
Australia Bank, which resulted in losses of $360 million to the bank, and which 
APRA ascribed to ‘cultural issues’.56 
 
C. The Netherlands57 
 
The Kingdom of the Netherlands was second to adopt a Twin Peaks approach in 
2002,58 retaining prudential supervision within De Nederlandsche Bank NV59 (‘The 
Dutch Bank’ (DNB)). This is similar to the arrangement in the UK, but distinct from 
Australia, where, as mentioned previously, the prudential regulator (APRA) is 
separate from the NCB. 
                                                 
54 Ibid. 
55  See for example the work of Kahneman, 2002 Nobel Laureate in Economic Sciences, in: D. 
Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow, 1st ed., Farrar, Straus and Giroux, (2011). 
56 Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, ‘Report into Irregular Currency Options Trading at the 
National Australia Bank’, Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, (23 March, 2004), 6. 
57 Elements of this section appeared in a previous article, published as a working paper by the Centre 
for International Finance and Regulation: A. D. Schmulow, supra note 2, 33ff. 
58 International Monetary Fund, ‘Kingdom of the Netherlands-Netherlands: Publication of Financial 
Sector Assessment Program Documentation—Technical Note on Financial Sector Supervision: The 
Twin Peaks Model’, in Financial Sector Assessment Program Update, IMF Country Report No. 
11/208, International Monetary Fund, (July, 2011), Table 1, 6. See also: H. Prast & I. van Lelyveld, 
‘New Architectures in the Regulation and Supervision of Financial Markets and Institutions: The 
Netherlands’, in DNB Working Paper, no. 021/2004, De Nederlandsche Bank, (21 December, 2004). 
59  De Nederlandsche Bank, ‘DNB Supervisory Strategy 2010 – 2014’, in Supra-institutional 
perspective, strategy and culture, De Nederlandsche Bank, (April, 2010), 21; E. Wymeersch, ‘The 
Structure of Financial Supervision in Europe: About Single Financial Supervisors, Twin Peaks and 
Multiple Financial Supervisors’, 8 (2) European Business Organization Law Review (EBOR) (June, 
2007), 16. 
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The Dutch copied the Australian approach, particularly as it applied to 
supervisory strategy - PAIRS and SOARS - both of which the Dutch regulator, the 
DNB, adopted.60 
While the Netherlands, under a Twin Peaks regime, managed to stave-off the 
worst of the GFC, success for the Dutch authorities in an economy with such an 
important financial sector was not achieved without ‘drastic’ 61  government 
intervention.62 
 
Total foreign claims of Dutch banks amounted to over 300% of GDP. The Dutch 
financial system therefore depended heavily on external developments. Only the 
Belgian and Irish banking sectors were in a similar position. The European 
average was less than half the Dutch figure at 135% of GDP … exposure of 
Dutch banks to the United States also was the highest in Europe, at 66% of GDP 
… whereas the average of European banks had kept limited exposure of less 
than 30% of GDP. By contrast, the exposure of Dutch banks to hard-hit Eastern 
European countries was at 11% of GDP just above the European average of 8% 
of GDP.63 
 
Intervention during the crisis took the form of measures to stimulate 
employment through construction and housing (€ 6 billion); capital injections for 
banks and insurers (€ 20 billion); state guarantees for banks (€ 200 billion); a 
guarantee on all deposits up to €100,000;64 the nationalisation of Fortis/ABN AMRO 
(€ 16.8 billion) and ING banking group (€ 10 billion) (comprising eighty-five per cent 
                                                 
60 J. Black, ‘Regulatory Styles and Supervisory Strategies’, Chap. 8, in The Oxford Handbook of 
Financial Regulation, edited by N. Moloney, E. Ferran & J. Payne, Oxford University Press, (August, 
2015), p 262. 
61 De Nederlandsche Bank, ‘Annual Report 2009’, De Nederlandsche Bank NV, (24 March, 2010), 37, 
and Chart, 45. 
62 See further: J. Black, supra note 60, 47, (fn 128). 
63 M. Masselink & P. van den Noord, ‘The Global Financial Crisis and its effects on the Netherlands’, 
6 (10) ECFIN (Economic analysis from the European Commission’s Directorate-General for 
Economic and Financial Affairs) Country Focus (4 December, 2009), 3. 
64 Ministry of Finance, Government of the Netherlands, ‘The Netherlands and the credit crisis’, in 
Financial Policy, published by Ministry of General Affairs, (undated), accessed: 11 January, 2015. 
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of the Dutch banking sector65), and the SNS REAAL insurance and banking group (€ 
3.7 billion);66 and a reform of the financial system and the capital levels that had been 
enforced to date. Thereafter the Dutch government was compelled to drastically 
reduce spending in order to reduce its deficit.67 
In the aftermath of the crisis, the conclusions reached about the performance 
of the Dutch regulators were less than positive: 
 
Both in the run-up to and during the credit crisis, supervisory instruments fell 
short in several areas. These deficiencies emerged in both the scope and the 
substance of supervision. The trend towards lighter supervision, reflecting 
developments within the financial sector as well as changed social attitudes, 
[had] gone too far.68 
 
This finding supports the conclusions reached in the analysis of the 
performance of the UK regulatory authorities during the GFC, namely that regulatory 
architecture alone is not a panacea against financial crises. Doubtless regulatory 
architecture is part of the solution, but no more so than the capacity of the regulators 
to foresee, at times, the unforeseeable,69 and regulate accordingly; and the willingness 
of the regulators to enforce their regulations. 
 
D. South Africa 
 
For South Africa the problem of the current regulatory structure was highlighted, with 
a degree of disapproval, by the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) Report, 
                                                 
65 M. Van Oyen, ‘Ringfencing or Splitting Banks: A Case Study on The Netherlands’, 19 (1) The 
Columbia Journal of European Law Online (Summer 2012), 6. 
66 T. Escritt & A. Deutsch, ‘Netherlands nationalizes SNS Reaal at cost of $5 billion’, Reuters, United 
States ed., (Friday, 1 February, 2013, 6:30 am). 
67 Ministry of Finance, Government of the Netherlands, supra note 64. 
68  De Nederlandsche Bank, ‘DNB Supervisory Strategy 2010 - 2014 and Themes 2010’, De 
Nederlandsche Bank, (April, 2010), 5. 
69 See for example: M. Douglas & A. Wildavsky, Risk and Culture: An Essay on the Selection of 
Technological and Environmental Dangers, revised ed., University of California Press, (1983), p 1, 
where the authors state: ‘Can we know the risks we face, now or in the future? No, we cannot; but yes, 
we must act as if we do.’ 
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conducted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) in 
2008.70 As a result, the National Treasury of the Republic of South Africa, in its 2011 
Report,71  identified financial regulatory reform as a necessity, and committed the 
Republic to adopting a Twin Peaks model of financial regulation,72 modelled broadly 
on that currently in use in Australia.  
Historically South Africa had adopted an institutional approach in which 
banks, insurers and capital markets were regarded as separate species.73 Regulation 
was typified by a lack of co-ordination.74 
The 1987 de Kock Commission Report, chaired by Dr Gerhardus de Kock, 
later Governor of the South African Reserve Bank, reformed the regulatory system in 
South Africa, and implemented a functional financial regulatory approach.75 
While the 1993 the Melamet Commission, chaired by Judge David Melamet, 
recommended a single regulator, the regulatory system has remained functional and 
partially integrated.76 Currently the financial system is regulated by the South African 
Reserve Bank (SARB)77 and the Financial Services Board (FSB).78 The FSB is a 
statutory body charged with the task of overseeing the non-bank financial industry 
(NBFI),79 which in turn is currently covered by twelve separate pieces of legislation 
plus its own enabling Act.80 In respect of NBFIs, the FSB has a market abuse remit, 
                                                 
70  S. Kal Wajid, ‘South Africa: Financial System Stability Assessment, Including Report on the 
Observance of Standards and Codes on the following topic: Securities Regulation’, in Financial System 
Stability Assessment, no. 08/349, International Monetary Fund, (October, 2008). 
71 Republic of South Africa National Treasury, ‘A safer financial sector to serve South Africa better’, 
in National Treasury Policy Document, National Treasury, Republic of South Africa, (23 February, 
2011). 
72 Ibid., 5. 
73 D. Rajendaran, ‘Approaches to Financial Regulation and the case of South Africa’, IFMR Finance 
Foundation (6 March, 2012). 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid. 
77 South African Reserve Bank Act, No. 90 of 1989, (Republic of South Africa). 
78 Financial Services Board Act, No. 97 of 1990, (Republic of South Africa). 
79 Financial Services Board, ‘Welcome to the FSB’, in About Us, published by Financial Services 
Board, (1996-2013), accessed: 17 August, 2014, https://www.fsb.co.za/aboutUs/Pages/default.aspx. 
80 Collective Investment Schemes Control Act, No. 45 of 2002, (Republic of South Africa); Credit 
Rating Services Act, No. 24 of 2002, (Republic of South Africa); Financial Advisory and 
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carried out by the Directorate of Market Abuse (DMA).81 Market abuse in terms of 
the Financial Markets Act consists of insider trading,82 market manipulation,83 and 
false reporting.84 
The prohibitions against market abuse, the Directorate’s powers to investigate, 
and the administrative sanctions and penalties which the Directorate may bring to 
bear are set out in Chapter X85 of the Financial Markets Act,86 for offences committed 
after 3 June 2013. For offences alleged to have taken place prior to 3 June 2013, the 
provisions of Chapter VIII87 of the Securities Services Act88 will apply. 
Currently, the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act89 is in force, 
and has as one of its principal aims the protection of consumers.90 
                                                                                                                                           
Intermediaries Services Act (FAIS Act), No. 37 of 2002, (Republic of South Africa); Financial 
Institutions (Protection of Funds) Act, No. 28 of 2001, (Republic of South Africa); Financial Markets 
Act, No. 19 of 2012, (enacted: 1 February, 2013), (Republic of South Africa); Financial Services Board 
Act, No. 97 of 1990; Financial Services Ombud Schemes Act, No. 37 of 2004, (enacted: 9 February, 
2005), (Republic of South Africa); Financial Supervision of the Road Accident Fund Act, No. 8 of 
1993, (Republic of South Africa); Friendly Societies Act, No. 25 of 1956, (Republic of South Africa); 
Inspection of Financial Institutions Act, No. 80 of 1988, (Republic of South Africa); Long-term 
Insurance Act, No. 52 of 1998, (Republic of South Africa); Pension Funds Act, No. 24 of 1956, 
(Republic of South Africa); Short-term Insurance Act, No. 53 of 1998, (Republic of South Africa). 
81 Financial Services Board, ‘Market Abuse’, in About Us, published by Financial Services Board, 
(1996-2013), accessed: 17 August, 2014, 
https://www.fsb.co.za/departments/marketAbuse/Pages/Home.aspx, and created pursuant to s 85 of the 
Financial Markets Act, No. 19 of 2012. 
82 Prohibited by s 78, Financial Markets Act, No. 19 of 2012. 
83 Prohibited by s 80, ibid. 
84 Prohibited by s 81, ibid. 
85 Sections 77 to 89, ibid. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Sections 72 to 87, Securities Services Act, No. 36 of 2004, (Republic of South Africa). 
88 Ibid. 
89 Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act, No. 37 of 2002, (Republic of South Africa). 
90  Financial Services Board, ‘Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services’, in Regulatory 
Examinations, published by Financial Services Board, (1996-2013), accessed: 17 August, 2014, 
https://www.fsb.co.za/Departments/fais/Pages/Regulatory-Examinations.aspx. ‘Undesirable Practices’, 
s 34 (1), Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act, No. 37 of 2002, which states: ‘Subject to 
subsections (2) and (3), the registrar may by notice in the Gazette declare a particular business practice 
to be undesirable for all or a category of authorised services providers, or any such provider’, 
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(subsequently replaced by s 196 (a), Financial Services Laws General Amendment Act, No. 45 of 2013, 
(Republic of South Africa), which states: ‘(1) Subject to subsections (2) and (3), the registrar may by 
notice in the Gazette declare a particular business practice to be undesirable for all or a category of 
authorised services providers, or any such provider.’). S 34 (2), Financial Advisory and Intermediary 
Services Act, No. 37 of 2002, which states: ‘(2) The following principles must guide the registrar in 
considering whether or not a declaration contemplated in subsection (1) should be made: (a) That the 
practice concerned, directly or indirectly, has or is likely to have the effect of – (i) harming the 
relations between authorised financial services providers or any category of such providers, or any such 
provider, and clients or the general public; (ii) unreasonably prejudicing any client; (iii) deceiving any 
client; or (iv) unfairly affecting any client; and (b) that if the practice is allowed to continue, one or 
more objects of this Act will or is likely to, be defeated. (3) The registrar may not make such a 
declaration unless the registrar has by notice in the Gazette published an intention to make the 
declaration, giving reasons therefor [sic], and invited interested persons to make written representations 
thereanent so as to reach the registrar within 21 days after the date of publication of that notice. (4) An 
authorised financial services provider or representative may not, on or after the date of the publication 
of a notice referred to in subsection (1), carry on the business practice concerned.’ (Subsequently 
replaced by s 196 (b), Financial Services Laws General Amendment Act, No. 45 of 2013, which states: 
‘(4) An authorised financial services provider or representative may not, on or after the date of the 
publication of a notice referred to in subsection (1), carry on the business practice concerned.’). S 34 
(5), Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act, No. 37 of 2002, states: ‘The registrar may 
direct an authorised financial services provider who, on or after the date of the publication of a notice 
referred to in subsection (1), carries on the business practice concerned in contravention of that notice, 
to rectify to the satisfaction of the registrar anything which was caused by or arose out of the carrying 
on of the business practice concerned: Provided that the registrar may not make an order contemplated 
in section 6D (2)(b) of the Financial Institutions (Protection of Funds) Act, (sic) 2001 (Act No. 28 of 
2001).’ (Subsequently replaced by s 60 (a), Financial Services Laws General Amendment Act, No. 22 
of 2008, (Republic of South Africa), which states: ‘by the substitution for subsection (5) of the 
following subsection: “(5) The registrar may direct an authorised financial services provider who, on or 
after the date of the publication of a notice referred to in subsection (1), carries on the business practice 
concerned in contravention of that notice, to rectify [or reinstate] to the satisfaction of the registrar [any 
loss or damage] anything which was caused by or arose out of the carrying on of the business practice 
concerned: Provided that the registrar may not make an order contemplated in section 6D (2)(b) of the 
Financial Institutions (Protection of Funds) Act, 2001 (Act No. 28 of 2001).”;’). S 34 (6), Financial 
Advisory and Intermediary Services Act, No. 37 of 2002, which states: ‘An authorised financial 
services provider concerned who is under subsection (5) directed to rectify anything, must do so within 
60 days after such direction is issued.’ (Subsequently replaced by s 60 (b), Financial Services Laws 
General Amendment Act, No. 22 of 2008, which states: ‘by the substitution for subsection (6) of the 
following subsection: “(6) An authorised financial services provider concerned who is under subsection 
(5) directed to rectify [or reinstate] anything, must do so within 60 days after such direction is 
issued.”.’). 
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In addition, there are consumer protection provisions which are enforced by 
the Office of the Ombud for Financial Services Providers (FAIS Ombud). 91  The 
Ombud is a statutory body92 empowered to deal with complaints against financial 
institutions which do not fall within the jurisdiction of any other ombud scheme, or 
where there is uncertainty over jurisdiction. 
Currently, deposit-taking banks are regulated by the Banking Supervision 
Department (BSD) of the SARB.93 In addition, the National Credit Regulator94 has as 
its’ objective to promote fairness in accessing consumer credit, consumer protection 
and competitiveness in the credit industry. 
 
        95 
 
                                                 
91 The Office of the Ombud for Financial Services Providers, ‘Welcome to FAIS Ombud’, published 
by The Office of the Ombud for Financial Services Providers, (2012-2014), accessed: 17 August, 2014, 
http://www.faisombud.co.za. 
92 Established by the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act, No. 37 of 2002. From the 1
st
 
of April 2005, the FAIS Ombud was created as a Statutory Ombud under the Financial Services 
Ombud Schemes Act, No. 37 of 2004, giving the entity original jurisdiction. 
93 South African Reserve Bank, ‘Bank Supervision’, in Regulation and supervision, published by the 
South African Reserve Bank, (undated), accessed: 17 August, 2014, 
https://www.resbank.co.za/RegulationAndSupervision/BankSupervision/Pages/BankSupervision-
Home.aspx. 
94  National Credit Regulator, ‘About the NCR’, published by National Credit Regulator, (2014), 
accessed: 17 August, 2014, http://www.ncr.org.za. A statutory body created by the National Credit Act, 
No. 34 of 2005, (Republic of South Africa). 
95 D. Rajendaran, supra note 73. 
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Against this backdrop the IMF issued its 2008 Financial Sector Assessment 
Program (FSAP) Report.96 In respect of financial system regulation, the Report stated 
as follows: 
 
‘The financial sector regulatory framework is modern and generally effective. 
There is a need to strengthen supervision of conglomerates with a focus on risks 
that span more than one sector, and to further promote cooperation, consistency, 
and effectiveness among regulators.’97 
 
             98 
 
As a result the South African Treasury issued a report on financial sector 
regulation,99 aimed at addressing the shortcomings identified by the IMF Report.100 
Principally the South African Treasury Report proposed the adoption of a Twin Peaks 
model of financial system regulation.101 The Treasury Report stated: 
                                                 
96 S. Kal Wajid, supra note 70. 
97 S. Kal Wajid, supra note 70, 1. 
98 Ibid., 24. 
99 Republic of South Africa National Treasury, supra note 71. 
100 S. Kal Wajid, supra note 70. 
101 Republic of South Africa National Treasury, supra note 71, 28. 
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The twin peaks approach is regarded as the optimal means of ensuring that 
transparency, market integrity, and consumer protection receive sufficient 
priority, and given South Africa’s historical neglect of market conduct 
regulation, a dedicated regulator responsible for consumer protection, and not 
automatically presumed to be subservient to prudential concerns, is probably the 
most appropriate way to address this issue… the existence of separate prudential 
and market conduct regulators may be a way of creating a system of checks and 
balances, thereby avoiding the vesting of too much power in the hands of a 
single agency… the flip side of creating checks and balances is the need to 
carefully define roles and responsibilities to avoid duplication of work and 
jurisdictional overlap… separation of prudential and market conduct regulation 
does not eliminate the possibility of conflict between them… consultation 
between the two bodies would lead to an acceptable compromise. But if not, 
some external means would need to be found to reconcile objectives. In South 
Africa, the formal way of resolving conflict will be through the Council of 
Financial Regulators.102 
 
As a result, the South African Treasury has put forward a draft Financial 
Sector Regulation Bill which, as at time of writing, had recently been tabled in South 
Africa’s National Parliament.103 The Bill makes provisions for the establishment of a 
Twin Peaks system in South Africa, and envisages the creation of a Financial System 
Council of Regulators, 104  which will co-ordinate financial regulation; and the 
                                                 
102 Ibid., 28. Pursuant to advice provided by the writer to the South African Treasury in 2015, this has 
now be renamed the ‘Financial System, Council of Regulators’. National Treasury, Republic of South 
Africa, ‘Financial Sector Regulation Bill, Comments Received on the Second Draft Bill Published by 
National Treasury for Comments on 11 December 2014 (Comment Period from 11 December 2014 - 
02 March 2015)’, National Treasury, Republic of South Africa, (2015), 120. See also Chap. 5, Part 2, s 
79 (1), Financial Sector Regulation Bill (2nd Draft), (21 August 2015), (Republic of South Africa). 
103 Tabled Bill no. B34-2015, (27 October, 2015). National Treasury, Republic of South Africa, ‘Media 
statement: Tabling of Financial Sector Regulation Bill to give effect to Twin Peaks reform’, published 
by National Treasury, Republic of South Africa, Pretoria, ZA, (27 October, 2015). 
104 S 79, Financial Sector Regulation Bill (2nd Draft), (21 August 2015), which states: ‘The Financial 
System Council of Regulators is hereby established. (2) The objective of the Financial System Council 
of Regulators is to facilitate co-operation and collaboration, and, where appropriate, consistency of 
action, between the institutions represented on the Financial System Council of Regulators by 
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Financial Stability Oversight Committee,105 which will co-ordinate financial stability 
issues, and endeavour to mitigate risks to the financial system. 
 
III AN ANALYSIS OF THE REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT 
METHODOLOGY IN AUSTRALIA 
 
This part provides an analysis of risk-based financial regulation, and its close 
cousins,106 principles-based and outcomes-focused regulation. Because these are terms 
of art, not science, they cannot be defined, or indeed even separated, precisely. They 
do, however, share methodological and philosophical characteristics, which bear 
investigating. 
 
What lies under the labels is an agglomeration of regulatory styles and 
approaches, some of which are exhibited by some regulators, but not all of 
which are exhibited by all. … a rough guide to a roughly drawn regulatory 
world and how it has evolved.107 
 
Put simply, the hierarchy may be understood as follows: Risk-based 
regulations are the tactics for addressing the strategy provided by outcomes-focused 
regulation: risk-based regulation is focused on outcomes, and has, therefore, a natural 
affinity with, and folds into, an outcomes-focused paradigm.108 Outcomes-focused 
strategies, in turn, address the grand strategy outlined by principles-based regulation.  
 
A. Risk-based approach 
 
                                                                                                                                           
providing a forum for senior representatives of those institutions to discuss, and inform themselves 
about, matters of common interest.’ 
105 S 5, Financial Sector Regulation Bill, (11 December, 2013), (Republic of South Africa). 
106 J. Black, ‘OFR: the historical context’, Chap. 2, in Outcomes-Focused Regulation, A Practical 
Guide, edited by A. Hopper QC & G. Treverton-Jones QC, in ‘Legal Handbooks’, Law Society 
Publishing, (2011), 7/8. 
107 Ibid., 8. 
108 Ibid., 15. 
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If in Australia Twin Peaks is the regulatory architecture, then the risk-based model109 
as used by APRA is the plumbing.  
 
… at APRA, we have always been strong proponents of risk-based supervision. 
It’s inherent in our mission and values, and it’s ingrained in our supervisory 
approach. It’s in our DNA. For us, risk-based supervision is religion.110 
 
While risk-based models of enforcement are not exclusive to Twin Peaks, 
some would argue that a risk-based model of enforcement is a natural adjunct to Twin 
Peaks. Put differently, you need not have Twin Peaks to use a risk-based model, but 
you may need a risk-based model to use Twin Peaks. This due to the fact that the 
safety and soundness regulator is, by its nature, concerned with combatting systemic 
risk. 
Risk-based prudential regulation focuses on activities that pose the greatest 
risk to the regulators’ statutory obligations, as well as other, key goals. 111  This 
approach has been adopted in the UK, the Netherlands, Canada, the United States, 
Hong Kong, Ireland, is recommended by the 2012 standards of the OECD’s Financial 
Action Task Force, and is proposed for adoption by the Joint Committee of European 
Supervisory Authorities.112 It is the method preferred by the World Bank, the IMF and 
the Basel Committee.113 
 
As such, [this risk-based] approach is predicated on outcomes and thus has a 
natural affinity to [Outcomes Focused Regulation]: where conduct breaches a 
rule but does not have a substantive impact on, for example, consumer 
                                                 
109 Ibid., 9. For a history of risk-based financial regulation, see: J. Black, supra note 60, 261. For a 
history of the development of different philosophical approaches to regulation, see: J. Black, supra 
note 106, 8ff. 
110  D. Lewis, ‘Risk-Based Supervision: How Can We Do Better? An Australian Supervisory 
Perspective’, Paper presented at the Toronto Centre Program on Supervisory Experiences in 
Implementing Global Banking Reforms, Toronto, Toronto, CA, edited by Toronto Centre, Global 
Leadership in Financial Supervision, (19 June 2013), 1. 
111 J. Black, supra note 106, 9. 
112 J. Black, supra note 60, 261ff. 
113 J. Black, supra note 60, 265. 
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protection, the regulator will not act, or at least will not treat the issue as a 
matter of priority… a focus [therefore] on risks not rules.114 
 
Risk-based supervision is now seen as the hallmark of good regulation at the 
global level. … IOSCO … recommends to supervisors that they take a ‘risk-
based approach’[ 115 ]. The revised Basel Core Principles for Banking 
Supervision issued in 2012 require supervisors to adopt effective risk-based 
systems[116] … The Financial Stability Board (FSB)’s recommendations[117] for 
the supervision of globally systemic financial institutions (GSIFIs) echoes the 
call for a risk-based approach.118 
 
There are a number of advantages to a risk-based approach.119 Most notably 
there is an acknowledgement that in a rules-based paradigm of financial system 
regulation, regulators are often over-burdened by rules – rules which cannot be 
enforced in every firm, for every transaction, on every occasion. Selecting what to 
prioritise is, therefore, necessary and, according to Black120 ‘[t]hese selections have 
always been made, but risk-based frameworks both render the fact of selection 
explicit and provide a framework of analysis in which they can be made.’ 
 
                                                 
114 J. Black, supra note 106, 9. 
115 See: The International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), ‘Guidelines to Emerging 
Market Regulators Regarding Requirements for Minimum Entry and Continuous Risk-Based 
Supervision of Market Intermediaries, Final Report’, The International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO), (December, 2009), 9ff. 
116  See: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘Core Principles for Effective Banking 
Supervision’, Bank for International Settlements, (September, 2012), 4, (§ 12). 
117 See: Financial Stability Board, ‘Increasing the Intensity and Effectiveness of SIFI Supervision’, in 
Progress Report to the G20 Ministers and Governors, Financial Stability Board, (1 November, 2012), 
7. 
118 J. Black, supra note 60, 264. 
119  See: B. Carruthers, ‘“Objectives Based Regulation:” buzzword du jour?’, Out of the Crooked 
Timber of Humanity, No Straight Thing Was Ever Made, Blog, (2 April, 2008), accessed: 22 July, 
2015, http://crookedtimber.org/2008/04/02/“objectives-based-regulation”-buzzword-du-jour/. 
120 J. Black, supra note 106, 9. 
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… pick important problems and fix them.121 
 
But pragmatic as this approach may sound, it leads to several unintended 
consequences which, in turn, undermine the overall efficacy of this regulatory 
paradigm. These include: 
 the assumption that regulators are smart enough to ‘foresee the 
unforeseeable’.122 Put differently, there is an assumption that regulators will 
know from where the next financial crisis will come and, consequently, 
correctly identify which types of risks and what forms of conduct to prioritise. 
But, as was seen during the GFC, this assumption is not always correct: 
 
… indeed with respect to the global financial crisis more broadly, assumptions 
that had been made as to how markets would react in particular scenarios 
proved significantly misplaced, with risk events that had been anticipated to 
occur once in several lives of the universe … occurring every day.123 
 
 the model itself may incorrectly prioritise which risks to avoid, as distinct 
from a failure to identify the risk at all, and this was evident from the 
conclusions reached in the aftermath of the failure of HIH;124 
 there exists the potential for process-induced myopia. That is to say, a focus 
on the process upon which risk-based regulation relies, without paying 
sufficient attention to issues that are outside the scope of what is covered by 
the process.  
 
If little scope is given in practice for those engaged in working within the 
framework to work outside it where they see the need, the framework will always 
be prey to events that those working within it were not given the room to say they 
had seen.125 
                                                 
121  M. K. Sparrow, The Regulatory Craft: Controlling Risks, Solving Problems, and Managing 
Compliance, Council for Excellence in Government, (2000), Brookings Institution Press, 9. 
122 What Black refers to as ‘blind spots’. J. Black, supra note 34, 23. 
123 J. Black, ‘Learning from Regulatory Disasters’, in LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers, 
no. 24/2014, London School of Economics and Political Science, (2014), 14. 
124 J. Black, supra note 34, 23. 
125 Ibid., 23. 
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To this end anecdotal evidence suggests that criticism of APRA, and 
challenges to the organisation’s prevailing orthodoxies, are in danger of being 
met with hostility;126 
 there is, as a consequence, a lack of predictive certainty for the regulatees, as 
to what forms of conduct will be sanctioned and what forms not; 
 this in turn encourages a capricious regulatory environment, particularly 
where different individuals in the regulators take different approaches, or 
have different priorities;  
 an unpredictable regulatory environment, brought about by changes in the 
prevailing political climate;127 
 the potential for regulatees to encourage regulatory forbearance, by either 
arguing that the proposed sanctions pose a greater risk to the regulated entity, 
and therefore the entire financial system, than the misconduct itself;128 or 
 the potential for regulatees to encourage forbearance by arguing that similar 
conduct was expressly authorised by the regulator in the past, (constituting, as 
it did then, an acceptable risk); 
 what Llewellyn 129  refers to as the ‘Christmas tree effect’, 130  in which the 
regulator’s remit steadily increases – as perceptions of risk increase - with a 
wide array of ancillary functions, both to the point of over-burden and to the 
point of distraction from what should be core activities; 
 perceptions of risk are exactly that: perceptions. While APRA has attempted 
to create a methodology around the assessment of risk, and to lessen the 
                                                 
126 This anecdotal evidence is based upon the writer’s tenure at APRA in late 2013, and informal 
discussions with colleagues. 
127 See: J. Black, supra note 106, 10. See also: J. Black, supra note 34, 24ff, where she asserts that 
politically, a failing bank, which may be acceptable to the regulator, may be unacceptable to those in 
the community who stand to lose their deposits. To this can be added political pressure from bank 
owners for the bank to be rescued, despite the regulator’s willingness to allow the bank to fail. 
128 C. Binham & J. Guthrie, ‘FCA: On the wrong side of the argument?’, Financial Times, (2 July, 
2015, 7:29 pm). 
129 D. T. Llewellyn, supra note 24, 23. 
130  Citing M. Taylor & A. Fleming, ‘Integrated Financial Supervision: Lessons from Northern 
European Experience,’ in Policy Research Working Paper, no. 2223, The World Bank, (September, 
1999), 13, (§ 2.24). 
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impact upon the assessment of risk of individual perceptions, risk assessment 
is not and never will be as ‘“rational” [or] as consistent in substance as its 
form suggests.’131 
 
B. Outcomes-focused regulation 
 
The risk-based approach followed by the Australian prudential regulator falls easily 
within a ‘regulation by objective’132 paradigm; that is to say a paradigm the purpose of 
which is to ‘[achieve] particular and concrete outcomes’.133 This paradigm enjoys a 
number of advantages. These include: 
 regulators can be more effective, with each having clear objectives 
(outcomes) that do not overlap;  
 regulators can, as a result, be more accountable and more focused 134  on 
achieving those outcomes;  
 it creates checks and balances between agencies, and their objectives;135  
 it allows each regulator to create its own culture that best suits its objectives; 
and 
 it allows each regulator to acquire expertise specifically required to meet its 
objectives.136 
                                                 
131 J. Black, supra note 34, 24. 
132  G. D. Killoren, ‘Comparative Analysis of Non-U.S. Bank Regulatory Reform and Banking 
Structure’, Law & Business, edited by CCH Incorporated, Wolters Kluwer, (2009), 10. See also: H. M. 
Paulson Jr., R. K. Steel, D. G. Nason, K. Ayers, H. Etner, J. Foley III, G. Hughes, T. Hunt, K. Jaconi, 
C. Klingman, C. C. Ledoux, P. Nickoloff, J. Norton, P. Quinn, H. Schultheiss, M. Scott, J. Stoltzfoos, 
M. Ugoletti & R. Woodall, ‘The Department of The Treasury Blueprint For A Modernized Financial 
Regulatory Structure’, The Department of The Treasury, (March, 2008). 
133 B. Michael, S. Hak Goo & D. Wojcik, ‘Does Objectives-Based Financial Regulation Imply a 
Rethink of Legislatively Mandated Economic Regulation? The Case of Hong Kong and Twin Peaks 
Financial Regulation’, Social Science Research Network (12 November, 2014), 1/4ff. 
134 See also: D. T. Llewellyn, supra note 24, 26. 
135 R. K. Abrams & M. W. Taylor, ‘Issues in the Unification of Financial Sector Supervision’, in IMF 
Working Paper, no. WP/00/213, International Monetary Fund, (December, 2000), 17. 
136 C. Goodhart, P. Hartmann, D.T. Llewellyn, L. Rojas-Suarez & S. Weisbrod, ‘The institutional 
structure of financial regulation’, Chap. 8, in Financial Regulation: Why, How and Where Now?, 
Taylor & Francis, (2013), pp 156/7. 
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As with a risk-based paradigm, so too an outcomes-focused approach has its 
shortcomings. These relate to the manner in which objectives are identified and 
prioritised. As with a risk-based approach the danger remains that the regulator may 
identify the wrong objectives; or may initially identify the correct objectives, but fail 
to adjust those in light of changed circumstances; or may find itself captured by 
industry with a concomitant contamination of its objectives; or become suborned by 
political masters, in which the regulator’s objectives are once again contaminated. Put 
differently, with flexibility in priorities come opportunities for a more nuanced 
approach to combatting whatever problem the regulator is charged with preventing; 
but so too with flexibility come the pitfalls that arise wherever regulator’s are invested 
with discretion.137 
 
C. Principles-based regulation 
 
Both these approaches - objectives-based regulation and risk-based regulation – have 
as their over-arching paradigm principles-based regulation, in that neither focus on 
systems and processes, but on principles-based outcomes. Principles-based regulation, 
as an over-arching paradigm too, has its deficiencies. A principles based model sets-
forth broad principles to be followed, as opposed to prescriptive, inflexible rules 
governing specific activities, and requiring minimum standards of conduct. 
 
…means moving away from reliance on detailed, prescriptive rules and relying 
more on high-level, broadly stated rules or principles to set the standards by 
which regulated firms must conduct business. The term ‘principles’ can be used 
simply to refer to general rules, or also to suggest that these rules are implicitly 
higher in the implicit or explicit hierarchy of norms than more detailed rules: 
they express the fundamental obligations that all should observe.138 
                                                 
137 Indeed A. Demirgüç-Kunt & E. Detragiache, ‘Basel Core Principles and Bank Soundness, Does 
Compliance Matter?’, in Policy Research Working Paper, no. WPS5129, The World Bank, 
(Novemeber, 2009), 5, find in certain circumstances, an inverse correlation between regulator power 
and bank soundness: ‘… power of supervisors to license banks and regulate market structure are 
associated with riskier banks.’ 
138 J. Black, ‘Principles Based Regulation: Risks, Challenges and Opportunities’, Presentation by Julia 
Black on Principles Based Regulation to be followed by a Conversation with the Regulators, Sydney 
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So regulators, instead of focussing on prescribing the processes or actions that 
firms must take, should step back and define the outcomes that they require firms 
to achieve. Firms and their management will then be free to find the most 
efficient way of achieving the outcome required.139  
 
In 2008 the Australian Law Reform Commission Report into privacy put forth 
the following statement by Curtis to explain the advantages of a principles based 
regulatory regime: 
 
By encouraging organisations to recognise the business advantages of 
[compliance] and regulating their behaviour accordingly … regulatory 
approach where a legislative framework is balanced by an emphasis on … self-
regulation … inculcate the values and objectives … rather than just the 
superficial rules. … organisations … will understand the ideas behind the laws—
the principles—and will not become as confused by detailed … regulations.140 
 
These sentiments, expressed in respect of privacy regulations, have been 
expressed in similar vein to support the supposed advantages of a principles based 
regulatory regime, for the financial system.141 There is, however, a difference between 
information privacy regulations and financial system regulations, and one so crucial 
that it undermines the supposed advantages of the principles based model: financial 
                                                                                                                                           
Supreme Courthouse (Banco Court), Sydney, NSW, Faculty of Economics and Business, University of 
Sydney, (Wednesday 28th March 2007), 3. 
139 J. Black, supra note 138, 5. 
140 Curtis, quoted in D. Weisbrot (President), L. McCrimmon (Commissioner in charge), R. Croucher 
(Commissioner), Justice B. Collier (part-time Commissioner), Justice R. French (part-time 
Commissioner), Justice S. Kenny (part-time Commissioner) & Justice S. Kiefel (part-time 
Commissioner), ‘For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice (ALRC Report 108)’, no. 
108, 1, Part A, Chapter 4, Regulating Privacy, Australian Law Reform Commission, (12 August, 
2008), (§ 4.16). See further: The Treasury, Australian Government, ‘Statement of Expectations — 
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority’, in Statements of Expectations, published by The Treasury, 
Australian Government, (undated), accessed: 9 October, 2015, 
http://www.treasury.gov.au/~/media/Treasury/Policy%20Topics/Public%20Policy%20and%20Govern
ment/Statements%20of%20Expectations/Downloads/PDF/APRA_Statement_of_expectations.ashx, 2. 
141 J. Black, supra note 138, 2/7ff. 
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system regulations almost always contain an opportunity cost to the regulatee, in 
addition to the mere compliance cost.142 Put differently, in the financial system the 
costs of full regulatory compliance are potentially significantly higher,143  and the 
degree of convenience to the bank for non-compliance significantly greater.144 In this 
regard it is questionable whether Black is correct when she asserts that: ‘[r]egulatees 
have to take more responsibility for ensuring that they are achieving the right 
outcomes, not just going through the right processes’145 as this does not adequately 
take account of the compulsions, inherent in financial regulation, for regulatees to 
constantly look for ways to lessen the impact of the regulations to which they ought to 
adhere; not just including, but especially in respect of outcomes. 
Add to this the heady mixture created by a regulatory paradigm that is more 
one of managing conduct than enforcing discipline, 146  located within an overall 
strategy that seeks, at least initially, to be co-operative and collegial, as opposed to 
confrontational, 147  and seeks by negotiated settlement to define outcomes more 
                                                 
142 For more on the special nature of financial services regulation, and in particular the distinction that 
such services are incomplete contracts, relational rather than transactional, see: D. T. Llewellyn, ‘Trust 
and confidence in financial services: a strategic challenge’, 13 (4) Journal of Financial Regulation and 
Compliance (2005), 334/339/340/341; S. Bhati, ‘An Analysis of the Financial Services Regulations of 
Australia’, 4 (2) International Review of Business Research Papers (March, 2008), 14ff. Cf. D. T. 
Llewellyn, supra note 24, 5, who argues that compliance has a cost, but not a price. As a result 
consumers will, he argues, regard regulation as a free good, and over demand it, thus creating an 
inexorable tendency towards over regulation. This view, however, fails to adequately account for 
instances where industry pressure has succeeded in rolling-back regulation. See: A. E. Wilmarth Jr., 
‘Turning a Blind Eye: Why Washington Keeps Giving In to Wall Street’, 81 (4/4) University of 
Cincinnati Law Review (2013). 
143 For more on this from the perspective of risk methodology and game theory, and the so-called 
‘prisoner’s dilemma’, or what in economics is referred to as the ‘tragedy of the commons’, see: P. 
McConnell, Systemic Operational Risk: Theory, Case Studies and Regulation, Risk Books, (2015), pp 
404/5. 
144 See S. L. Schwarcz, ‘Systemic Risk’, 97 (1) The Georgetown Law Journal (2008), 206, quoted in P. 
McConnell, supra note 143, pp 50/1. 
145 J. Black, supra note 106, 11. 
146 J. Black, supra note 138, 19/20. 
147  I. MacNeil, ‘Enforcement and Sanctioning’, Chap. 10, in The Oxford Handbook of Financial 
Regulation, edited by N. Moloney, E. Ferran & J. Payne, in ‘Part III, Delivering Outcomes and 
Regulatory Techniques’, 1st ed., Oxford University Press, (August, 2015), p 285; A. D. Schmulow, 
supra note 2, 21ff. 
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general than specific, and it is no wonder that goals shift and outcomes become 
malleable. 
 
A principles-based approach does not work with individuals who have no 
principles.148 
 
Indeed, one could argue that if it is outcomes that are set as benchmarks, as 
opposed to processes,149 then all that is required in order to encourage regulators to 
forebear, is to re-negotiate the outcomes. A clearer and more straightforward 
objective than re-negotiating a myriad of complex processes. 
A further important factor determining the efficacy of regulators is the 
political climate in which they operate. 150  This will affect the robustness of 
enforcement, and it may extend to the vigour with which principles are at first 
determined, and later adjusted. The degree to which the United States’ Congress is 
beholden to Wall Street, 151  and the pushback against the FSA 152  in the UK are 
instructive in this respect.  
                                                 
148 Hector Sants, Chief Executive Officer, Financial Services Authority. Quoted in L. Elliott & J. 
Treanor, “Revealed: Bank of England disarray in the face of financial crisis”, The Guardian, (7 
January, 2015). 
149 D. Weisbrot (President), L. McCrimmon (Commissioner in charge), R. Croucher (Commissioner), 
Justice B. Collier (part-time Commissioner), Justice R. French (part-time Commissioner), Justice S. 
Kenny (part-time Commissioner) & Justice S. Kiefel (part-time Commissioner), supra note 140, (§ 
4.6). 
150 The very decision to regulate is political, and the form and extent thereof, ideological. B. Sheehy & 
D. Feaver, ‘Designing Effective Regulation: A Normative Theory’, 38 (1) University of New South 
Wales Law Journal (1 January, 2015), 394, and at 418: ‘Although the decision is ultimately made by a 
political body, such as the executive or legislature, the selection choice is frequently subverted at much 
earlier stages in the policy-making process. Ideology, political influence and even an adherence to 
intellectual fashion by advisers and experts all influence the decision.’ 
151 A. E. Wilmarth Jr., supra note 142; L. R. Wray, ‘Setting the Record Straight One More Time: 
BofA’s Rebecca Mairone Fined $1Million; BofA Must Pay $1.3Billion’, New Economic Perspectives, 
(2 August, 2014), accessed: 26 June, 2015, http://neweconomicperspectives.org/2014/08/setting-
record-straight-one-time-bofas-rebecca-mairone-fined-1million-bofa-must-pay-1-3billion.html; E. 
Wyatt, ‘Promises Made, Then Broken, By Firms in S.E.C. Fraud Cases’, New York Times, New York 
ed., (8 November, 2011). 
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And fashions, even in regulation, change. In the UK, Antony Jenkins, the patron 
saint of conduct risk, has just been unceremoniously dumped as CEO of 
Barclays Bank, ostensibly for concentrating on managing the bank’s toxic 
conduct rather than making profits. The conduct risk pendulum may already be 
beginning to swing back and the current fashion for piousness may be fading.153 
 
At first glance, Wall Street’s ability to block Dodd–Frank’s implementation 
seems surprising. After all, public outrage over Wall Street’s role in the global 
financial crisis impelled Congress to pass Dodd–Frank in 2010 despite the 
financial industry’s intense opposition. Moreover, scandals at systemically 
important financial institutions (SIFIs) have continued to tarnish Wall Street’s 
reputation since Dodd– Frank’s enactment. However, as the general public’s 
focus on the financial crisis has waned—due in large part to massive 
governmental support that saved Wall Street—the momentum for meaningful 
financial reform has faded.154 
 
Similarly, in Australia there are examples of what in the UK came to be know 
as the ‘light touch’.155 For example the regulators follow policies set-forth under Basel 
II in which banks are permitted to determine their own internal risk ratings.156 Put 
differently, IRB157 models, as they are known, permit a bank to determine whether it 
                                                                                                                                           
152 Anonymous, ‘Britain’s bank-basher-in-chief is toppled’, The Economist, Britain ed., (17th July, 
2015), http://www.economist.com/news/britain/21659145-ousting-citys-fiercest-watchdog-suggests-
more-emollient-political-mood-britains; C. Binham & J. Guthrie, supra note 128; T. Wallace, ‘FCA 
chief Martin Wheatley ousted by George Osborne’, The Telegraph, (Friday, 17 July, 2015), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/11746504/Coup-in-the-City-as-
George-Osborne-ousts-UKs-top-financial-regulator-Martin-Wheatley.html. 
153 P. McConnell, supra note 30. See also: K. C. Engel & P. A. McCoy, ‘Turning a Blind Eye: Wall 
Street Finance of Predatory Lending’, 75 (4) Fordham Law Review (March, 2007), 2040. 
154 A. E. Wilmarth Jr., supra note 142, 1283. 
155  See for example J. Treanor, ‘Farewell to the FSA – and the bleak legacy of the light-touch 
regulator’, The Guardian/The Observer, (24 March, 2013). 
156 See for example: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘An Explanatory Note on the Basel II 
IRB Risk Weight Functions’, Bank for International Settlements, (July, 2005). 
157 Internal ratings-based. 
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is complying with overall prudential principles. A model which gives rise to a 
dangerous conflict of interest,158 and one that is now being dismantled.159 
So while risk-based supervision, within a framework of outcomes-focused and 
principles-based regulatory strategies has advantages – especially as regards the 
prioritising of risks in an environment where risks and potential risks are potentially 
limitless – they are nonetheless vulnerable to institutional inadequacies, incorrect 
priorities, political interference, industry pressure and a failure to foresee the 
unforeseeable. They lead to a capricious and an unpredictable regulatory environment 
in which priorities are malleable, and in which regulators are susceptible to capture.160 
 
IV AUSTRALIA AND SOUTH AFRICA, DIFFERENCES AND 
SIMILARITIES 
 
The most noticeable difference between the Australian approach and the proposed 
South African model, is that the Australian Prudential Regulator is an independent 
                                                 
158 An example of what, according to Sheehy et al, is a form of ‘internal incoherence’. B. Sheehy & D. 
Feaver, supra note 150, 417. 
159 D. Henry & E. Stephenson, ‘Fed may shun global risk rules banks spent billions to meet’, Reuters, 
United States ed., (Wednesday, 4 June, 2014, 9:16pm EDT), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/05/us-banks-regulations-insight-idUSKBN0EF09U20140605. 
160 For a balanced view on this issue as it presents in the United States, see: L. G. Baxter, ‘Capture 
Nuances in Financial Regulation’, 47 (3) Wake Forest Law Review (Fall, 2012). Cf A. E. Wilmarth Jr., 
supra note 142. For the position in Australia see: P. McConnell, ‘Debunking the myth of our ‘well-
regulated’ banks’, The Conversation, (13 September, 2012 6.38am AEST), 
https://theconversation.com/debunking-the-myth-of-our-well-regulated-banks-9333, 4. For more on the 
susceptibility of fragmented agencies to capture, see: J. K. Gakeri, ‘Financial Services Regulatory 
Modernization in East Africa: The Search for a new paradigm for Kenya’, 1 (16) International Journal 
of Humanities and Social Science (November, 2011), 167/8; and on the advantages of the functional 
approach to resisting capture, see: Working Group on Financial Supervision, ‘The Structure of 
Financial Supervision. Approaches and Challenges in a Global Marketplace’, in Special Report, Group 
of Thirty, Consultative Group on International Economic and Monetary Affairs, Inc., (2008), 35. On 
accountability as a bulwark against capture, see: R. J. Herring & J. Carmassi, ‘The Structure of Cross‐
Sector Financial Supervision’, 17 (1) Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments, (February, 2008), 
24. 
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entity,161 whereas the South African proposal is for the Prudential Authority to be a 
division of the South African Reserve Bank,162 albeit as a separate juristic person.163 
While the Australian model provides a high degree of statutory independence 
to the system stability regulator, 164  APRA, it is to a degree answerable to the 
Treasurer,165 and both APRA166 and ASIC167 to the Federal Parliament by way of 
submission of Annual Reports. Taylor envisages either Ministerial oversight or 
Parliamentary oversight 168  in his model. The South African Bill envisages 
accountability to the National Treasury (and ultimately Parliament) through the 
Financial Stability Oversight Committee169 and the annual reporting requirements.170 
Consequently, this comports with Taylor’s original recommendation, 171  which he 
claims is more likely to negate the politicisation of the regulator, than would an 
arrangement that requires the regulator to be responsible only to Parliament. The 
internal logic of this argument is, however, difficult to discern. It could just as easily 
                                                 
161 Established under s 7, Australian Prudential Regulation Authority Act (Cth), No. 50 of 1998, as a 
body corporate, s 13, ibid. 
162 S 24 (1), (3) and (4) read with the objects and purport of s 33 (2), Financial Sector Regulation Bill, 
11 December, 2013. 
163 S 11 (2), Financial Sector Regulation Bill, 11 December, 2013.  
164 S 11, Australian Prudential Regulation Authority Act (Cth), No. 50 of 1998. 
165 S 12, ibid.; The Treasury, Australian Government, ‘Statement of Expectations for the Australian 
Prudential Regulation Authority’, published by The Treasury, Commonwealth Government of 
Australia, (20 February, 2007), 4/5.  
166 S 59, Australian Prudential Regulation Authority Act (Cth), No. 50 of 1998. 
167 S 136, Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act (Cth), No. 51 of 2001. 
168 M. W. Taylor, supra note 6, 11. 
169 The Financial Stability Oversight Committee gives the SARB, (of which the prudential regulator 
would be, it is envisaged, a department,) ultimate responsibility for financial stability: s 4, Financial 
Sector Regulation Bill, 11 December, 2013, and would be required to report to the Minister any threats 
to system stability: s 5 (2)(d), ibid., and which would, twice a year, be required to report to the Minister 
on the overall state of system stability: s 9, ibid. 
170 Part 7, s 39 (1)(a), ibid., which requires the regulatory authorities to report within 90 days of the end 
of the financial year, and s 39 (1)(b) which requires the Minister to table the regulatory authorities’ 
reports within 30 days to the National Assembly (Parliament of the Republic of South Africa). S 39 (3), 
ibid., requires the regulatory authorities to submit to the Minister a report on any other matter that may 
affect system stability, public finances, or any other matter deemed necessary, and must do so on an ad 
hoc basis, and of its own initiative. 
171 M. W. Taylor, supra note 6, 11. 
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be argued that responsibility to Parliament may ameliorate pressure from the 
Treasury, and may serve to countervail the possibility of regulatory capture. 
While there is no definitive answer to the question of whether it is better to 
locate the prudential regulator within the NCB, or outside, the balance of probabilities 
favours the latter.172 
 
V CONCLUSION 
 
If South Africa continues to develop, and succeeds in lifting more South Africans out 
of poverty, ever greater calls will be made on the private sector to provide a wide 
variety of savings and investment products, and self-funded social insurance. An 
agency dedicated to market conduct and consumer protection will, therefore, become 
ever more necessary. 
A bifurcated system, it is argued, is preferable. One entity will be responsible 
for system stability, including ongoing prudential regulatory enforcement and 
development, of all financially significant firms, including banks, insurers or a 
combination of the two, on a single and consolidated basis. This will prove even more 
important in the future, as the lines between banks, merchant banks and insurers 
continues to be blurred, and as the scale of interconnectedness between financial firms 
continues apace, particularly in the OTC173 derivatives market, in which banks and 
securities firms are the primary dealers. The size of the OTC market, the global 
notional value of which was a staggering US$ 710 trillion as at December 2013,174 
represents the clearest indication of the potential for interconnectedness, and poses a 
significant threat to any financial system through contagion, both endogenous and 
exogenous. Only a whole of entity, consolidated group approach can hope to address 
this interconnectedness. So, while South Africa came through the GFC relatively 
unscathed, due mainly to the conservative nature of its banking system, 175  the 
                                                 
172 See: A. D. Schmulow, supra note 1, 51ff. 
173 Over the counter. 
174 Bank for International Settlements, ‘International banking and financial market developments’, in 
BIS Quarterly Review, Bank for International Settlements, (September, 2014), Table 19, A 141. 
175 D. Cavvadas, ‘South Africa: A Sophisticated Securities and M&A Regime’, Securities and Mergers 
& Acquisitions Newsletter, Q1, (April 2010), accessed: 21 September, 2014, 
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experience gained from the GFC was that increasingly esoteric products, created by 
securities firms beyond the purview of institutional or functional regulators, created a 
blind spot for regulators in the USA and Europe; 176  one that ultimately had 
catastrophic economic consequences. 
The second entity will be responsible for market conduct and consumer 
protection. It is argued such a system would more likely to resolve fragmentation, 
provide clarity of ambit, be more cost-effective due to rulebook simplification, and 
improve accountability – more likely, but not definitely, as the recent failings of ASIC 
in Australia have demonstrated.177 If the consumer protection and market conduct 
regulator does prove effective, then advantages accrue to consumers for a ‘one-stop 
shop’178 for complaints against regulated firms. 
Ultimately, of course, the success of a Twin Peaks regime in South Africa will 
depend upon the efficacy of enforcement – governance – and this in turn will depend 
upon the goals that are set – the principles – and on how those goals are pursued. That 
in turn will depend upon market intelligence – the risks – along with the 
independence and the capacity of the regulators to pursue corrective action, free of 
interference or industry capture; co-ordination between the peaks; the resources – 
physical and human – which the regulators bring to bear, and their willingness, if 
need be, to take on vested and powerful interests. 
If successful, Twin Peaks will help lay the foundations for a dynamic financial 
sector, one that already plays a significant role - an excessive role according to 
                                                 
176 Working Group on Financial Supervision, supra note 160, 20. 
177 For a detailed account of the financial advice scandals in Australia, and the failures of ASIC, see: A. 
D. Schmulow, supra note 1, 47ff; Senator M. Bishop (Chair), Senator D. Bushby (Deputy Chair), 
Senator S. Dastyari, Senator L. Pratt, Senator J. Williams, Senator N. Xenophon, Senator D. Fawcett & 
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Masters, Banking Bad, in ‘Four Corners’, Audiovisual Material, Documentary, Sydney, NSW, 
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customers lose homes amid huge fraud claim’, The Age, (29 May, 2014); A. Ferguson & B. Butler, 
‘Commonwealth Bank facing royal commission call after Senate financial planning inquiry’, The 
Sydney Morning Herald, Business Day ed., (26 June, 2014). 
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some179 - in South Africa’s economy. If Twin Peaks fails, and fails under the wrong 
circumstances, such as another global financial crisis, the results will be catastrophic. 
                                                 
179 ‘Dangerously over-financialised’, and contributing twenty-eight per cent of South Africa’s GDP. B. 
Brkic, ‘Analysis: Is South Africa over-banked?’, Daily Maverick, (23 February, 2010 12:57) (South 
Africa)). 
